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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-
2-801 (1979), Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1988), Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996), and Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 14. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Although the brief of Stouffer Food and Liberty Mutual Insurance company enumerates two 
issues for review by the Court, the Utah Labor Commission ("Commission") believes that the issues 
are better addressed together. 
1. After The 1979 Amendments To Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, Is The 
Employer And/Or The Employer's Insurance Carrier liable For Continued 
Death Benefits To The Dependents Of A Deceased Covered Employee After 312 
Weeks Of Receiving Such Benefits, Or Is The Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
Liable For Such Continued Benefits ? 
Standard of Review: The Labor Commission agrees that this appeal concerns an issue of 
statutory construction which should be reviewed under a "correction of error" standard. Brown & 
Root v. Industrial Commission, 947 P. 2d 671 (Utah 1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Commission adopts the statement of the case, including the statement of facts, set forth 
in Stouffer Food's Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 was amended in 1979 by the 43rd legislature in Senate Bill 111 
with the specific legislative intent to shift liability for ongoing death benefits for surviving 
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dependants, after 312 weeks, from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer and/or the 
employer's insurance carrier. Floor Debate February 16, 1979, 43rd Legislature [ Commission's 
Exhibit "1"]. The legislature in passing Senate Bill 111, the 1979 amendment to Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-68, specifically found that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was, at that time, in danger of 
insolvency unless liability for ongoing death benefits after 312 weeks was shifted from the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer and/or the employer's insurance carrier. [ id.]. 
Contrary to Stouffer's interpretation, this Court in Hales found that after 1973, Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-70 became a vestigial appendage to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, and that Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-70 had escaped legislative repeal only by an oversight. Hales v. Industrial Commission, 854 
P. 2d 537, 542 fn. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 became irrelevant after 1973 
and is of no help to Stouffer. Id. 
ARGUMENT 
THE 1979 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-68 WAS 
SPECIFICALLY CRAFTED TO SHIFT LIABILITY FOR DEATH 
BENEFITS AFTER 312 WEEKS FROM THE EMPLOYERS' 
REINSURANCE FUND TO THE EMPLOYER AND/OR THE EMPLOYER'S 
INSURANCE CARRIER. 
Stouffer's arguments are largely dependant on an attempt by Stouffer to divine a legislative 
intent consistent with Stouffer's position by marshaling an involute arrangement of various sections 
from Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 and Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70. Such an exercise is unnecessary as 
the relevant legislative intent is readily accessible. 
The Utah Senate floor debate record from the 43rd legislature for February 16,1979, sets forth 
the comments of Senators Cornaby and Bunnell concerning the purpose of Senate Bill 111, which 
bill amended Utah Code §35-1-68 : 
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Cornaby: Senate Bill 111 comes to us from the State Industrial Commission 
and is entitled Workman's Compensation. The purpose of the bill is 
to correct an inequity which has arisen in the so called "second injury 
fund". Now this is the fund that pays benefits to spouses and 
dependants of covered workers who were killed in employment. At 
the present time the fund has become actuarially unsound and is 
getting further into an unsound position. The purpose of the of this 
bill is to correct that situation by transferring the, bv shifting the 
burden from the "second injury fund". The Industrial Commission 
has worked on this bill for the past year and have finally worked this 
solution to the problem. The bill is essential from this standpoint that 
if this not done we will find our "second injury fund" in a bankruptcy 
situation. I think senator Bunnell has a comment. 
Bunnell: As I understand this bill first it takes the spouse, the beneficiary out 
of the second injury fund and requires that the employer or the 
insurance company who had the original insurance will have to 
continue to pay those benefits That's roughly the purpose of this, 
and if we don't do that there isn't going to be any money in the 
second injury fund to pay anyone so I would urge the support of this 
bill. 
Floor Debate February 16, 1979, 43rd Legislature [Commission's Exhibit "1" emphasis added]. 
From the plain, simple statements of the legislative proponents of SB 111, the 1979 
amendment to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, there is no question that the legislative intent and purpose 
of the bill was to relieve the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("second injury fund") of any continued 
liability for death benefits under the statute, while in turn shifting that liability to the employer or 
the employer's insurance carrier. This in fact was the sole purpose of the 1979 amendment to Utah 
Code §35-1-68 because the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("second injury fund") was actuarially 
unsound and facing bankruptcy. Id_ 
With the straightforward legislative purpose of SB 111 set forth, the analysis of the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1979) provided by the Administiative Law Judge in the 
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Order dated December 18, 1997 (Stouffer's Exhibit "2"), and as adopted by the Appeals Board in 
its order of March 27, 1998, (Stouffer's Exhibit "3"), offers the only logically consistent analysis of 
the relevant code sections. Judge Elicerio correctly concludes that the 1979 amendment to Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-68 deletes or removes "Language, previously in the statute, specifically stating that 
the special fund (or ERF) was to pay continuing benefits" [Order of Judge Elicerio, December 18, 
1997, (Stouffer's Exhibit "2" p. 105), citing Laws of Utah, 1979, Ch. 138, p.778, subsection (2) (d) 
interlined language, (Commission's Exhibit "2")]. Judge Elicerio also observes that the 1979 
amendment to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 reorganizes " [t]he subsections, to place the new language 
regarding payment of continuing benefits under the general language describing the liability of the 
employer/carrier" [Order of Judge Elicerio, December 18, 1997, (Stouffer's Exhibit "2" p. 105), 
citing Laws of Utah, 1979, Ch. 138, p.778, subsection (2) (b) (ii) interlined language, [Commission's 
Exhibit "2")]. The 1988 amended version of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 referenced by Stouffer, 
contains nothing that would alter the 1979 amendment's transfer of liability for continued death 
benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer or the employer's insurance earner 
that was effected by the 1979 amendment. 
Stouffer tries to argue that the following language in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1) (1988) 
indicates that the 1979 amendment did not shift liability for continuing death benefits from the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer or the employer's insurance carrier: 
There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of making 
payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. This fluid shall succeed to 
monies previously held in the "Special Fund", the "Combined Injury Fund", or the 
"Second Injury Fund". 
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Stouffer contends that since the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was statutorily created to 
"make payments", those payments must necessarily be the continued payment of death benefits after 
312 weeks for new cases arising after the 1979 amendment. [Stouffer's Brief p.12]. Stouffer's non 
sequitur ignores the fact that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund was created to succeed to the 
"Special Fund", the "Combined Injury Fund", and the "Second Injury Fund", and therefore the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund succeeded to the liabilities incurred by those funds prior to the 1979 
amendment. Certainly the Employers' Reinsurance Fund would have to make payments, namely 
those ongoing payments for liabilities incurred prior to the 1979 amendment to Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-68. 
Stouffer next asserts that the requirements contained in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d) 
(1988) demonstrate that the statute logically requires the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to continue 
to fund continuing death benefits because, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d) (1988) requires the 
employer to pay to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund the difference between $30,000 and what the 
employer actually paid to the decedent employee's dependants prior to the termination of 
dependency. [Stouffer's Brief p. 14]. Stouffer maintains that the statute would not require the 
employer to help finance the Employers' Reinsurance Fund if the Fund did not continue to incur new 
liability for death benefits. Id. 
Stouffer fails to mention the fact that the provisions in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d) 
(1988) were deleted in the 1990 amendment to the statute Seei Laws Of Utah, 1990, Ch. 110, pp 
404-405 [Commission's Exhibit "3"]. The 1990 amendment is some four years prior to the 1994 
amendment, which 1994 amendment Stouffer contends was the actual amendment relieving the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund of liability for continuing death benefits [Stouffer's Brief p. 16]. 
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Under Stouffer's reasoning, in 1990 the legislature stripped the Employers' Reinsurance Fund of its 
financing source for the payment of continuing death benefits some four years before the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund was relieved of liability for paying the same benefits. As indicated earlier, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund did continue to have some responsibility for prior incurred liability, 
which more logically accounts for the legislature delaying the removal of the funding provisions 
contained in former Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d) (1988) until 1990. Stouffer's reliance on 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (2) (d) (1988) is without any compelling significance. 
Stouffer, next urges that because the 1994 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 
specifically references the employer and the insurance carrier in Subsection (5) (a) (ii) that this is 
the amendment that was intended to finally shift liability for death benefits from the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund to the employer or the employer's insurance carrier. As stated by the 
Administrative Law Judge, the specific reference to the employer and the employers' insurance 
carrier contained in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (5)(a) (ii) (1994) merely clarified what had been a fact 
since the 1979 amendment. 
Stouffer's most puzzling argument is Stouffer's simultaneous reliance on Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-70 (1953) together with the case Hales v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 854 P. 2d 537 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1993). Stouffer contends that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) specifically places liability 
for continuing death benefits on the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and limits the liability of the 
employer and or the employer's insurance carrier. [Stouffer's Brief p. 12 -13, 16]. Apparently, 
Stouffer overlooked foot note 7 of the Hales case which pointedly observes: 
Admittedly, under the present statutory scheme in which the extension of benefits 
beyond the six-year period is no longer discretionary with the Commission so long 
as death benefit recipients remain dependent, section [35-1-]70 would rarely, if ever, 
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be applied It appears the section escaped repeal, as no longer necessary, by virtue 
of separate section status As a glance at the annotation notes will show, the 
legislature has repeatedly tinkered with section [35-l-]68, unmindful that, from 1973 
on, those changes lendeied section [35-1 -]70. to which no particular legislative 
attention seems to have been paid for over seven decades, quite unnecessary 
Hales v Industnal Commission of Utah, 854 P 2d at 542 fn 7 [emphasis added] It is obvious that 
Utah Code Ann §35-1-70 is a vestigial artifact that from 1973 on has "escaped repeal" even though 
it is wholly unnecessary Id_ See also Order of Administrative Law Judge dated December 18, 
1997, Stouffer's Exhibit "2" p 106 (Judge Ehceno observes that "[t]he legislature did not mean for 
this section to specify liability foi ERF following the initial 312 weeks of death benefits, aftei the 
legislature cieated employer/camei liability for these continuing benefits in 1979 To read it 
otheiwise would mean that the legislatuie intended to have two mutually exclusive piovisions to be 
in existence, one specifying employei/carner liability for the continuing benefits and the other 
specifying ERF liability foi the same benefits ") 
Stouffer again attempts to salvage its position by interpreting the Hales case as somehow 
supporting the proposition that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund is liable for continuing death 
benefits under post 1979 Utah Code Ann §35-1-68 (Stouffei's Brief pp 17-18) Stouffei quotes 
foot note 5 of Hales in its entirety but, disiegaids the preface to the foot note wheiem the Court 
states "We express no definite opinion on the issue likely to resurface on lemand, namel}, whether 
petitioneis' claim should have been asserted against the fund " Hales v Industrial Commission 
of Utah. 854 P 2d at 542 fn 5 The Court in Hales unambiguously disclaims issuing an opinion on 
the liability of the Employers' Remsuiance Fund under Utah Code Ann §35-1-68 Stouffer cannot 
side step the Court's own disclaimer in Hales 
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CONCLUSION 
The plainly stated intent of the Utah Legislature in passing Senate Bill 111, the 1979 
amendment to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, was to rescue an insolvent fund by shifting liability for 
continuing death benefits under the act from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the employer and 
or the employer's insurance carrier. It makes little sense that the legislature, having announced its 
purpose for propounding Senate Bill 111, to proceed and pass an amendment that in effect left the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund liable for ongoing death benefits under the statute while on the road 
to bankruptcy. After the 1979 amendment, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68, can only reasonably be read 
to shift liability for newly incurred death benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to the 
employer and or the employer's insurance carrier. The Court of Appeals should dismiss Stouffer's 
appeal and affirm the Order of the Appeals Board of the Utah labor Commission. 
Submitted this 1 C \ day of July, 1998. 
I ^/Mcmvd M. LaJeuh^se 
/Associate General Counsel 
\UtamMbor Commission 
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Tabl 
Legislative Excerpt 
February 16 1979 
Senate Bill 111 
Senator; Cornaby and teuc-i •.-.. 
President: ....Second reading calendar, Senate Bill 
Clerk: Senate Bill number 111, Workman's Compensation by Senator Cornaby. '1 he 
report reads Mr. President the [inaudible] Committee on Business, Labor and 
Economic Development which was referred Senate Bill 111, Workman's 
Compensation by Senator Cornaby, has carefully considered the bill and reports 
the same out favorably. Respectfully Senator Arnold Christensen, Committee 
Chairman. 
•l'!/!iaf>H 
Asay: 
President: 
Group: 
Preside!;: 
Cornaby: 
I move that we adopt the committee report 
You've heard die motion thai w^ <\L:- a.-: ,<• n;n; uv report. ] 'iscussioi i All in 
favor of the motion say aye. 
Aye 
rhose opposed, no. The motion carries. 'in<:ro:na 
bill is before us. Senator Cornaby. 
nee rciioi JUOi 
President: 
Senate Bill 111 comes to us from the State Industrial Commission and is entitled. 
Workman's Compensation. The purpose of the bill is to correct an inequity which 
has arisen in the so called second injury fund. Now this is the fund that pays 
benefits to spouses and dependents of covered workers who were killed in 
employment. At the present time the fund has become actuarially unsound and is 
getting further into an unsound position. The purpose of this bill is to correct that 
situation by transferring the, by shifting the burden from the second injury fund. 
The Industrial Commission has worked on this bill for the past year and have 
finally worked out this solution to the problem. The bill is essential from this 
standpoint that if this is not done we will find our second injury fund in a 
bankruptcy situation. I think Senator Bunnell had a comment. 
Senmor Bunion, is n a i^ion comment? 
Well, I can make it as short as you like. 1 thmk this is a good bill, if y<m want to 
pass it. There's some history behind this bill. 1 v''o \\ tei! you aa! of il, but some 
years back, Senator Wadingham is gone, he was iuvuiveu -n daz, di^ suoo.id 
injury fund, as I remember it, Steve Hadley over there can get me out of troub: i 
I don't explain it right, if a husband is killed then the, the spouse I beg yoiir 
pardon, is killed, then the state insurance fund, the surviving, I'll say widow, in 
this case, is paid compensation according to how much the husband made for six 
years. And that the cost of that is born by the employer. Now we cannot deny 
now, what we call the second injury fund in which we funded mostly through 
taxes on insurance policies and perhaps some other things that after the six year 
period if the wife is still dependent and if the children haven't reached maturity 
then the second injury fund took over and paid it from then on, there are also 
some other disabled people paid out of this but for the purposes of this bill, as I 
understand it we're only talking about surviving spouses. Back, when was this 
Steve, '65, 73 that's right we amended this bill and increased the benefits and at 
that time Lynn Richards who was the, kind of the godfather of the state insurance 
fund advised us that when they went on the second injury fund we should reduce 
their payments by the amount of their social security. Well we were kind of 
bleeding heart fellows and we wanted to take care of the widows so we refused to 
accept Lynn's recommendation and said that she was entitled to both the 
compensation and a full social security. Lynn pointed out that this might be more 
than she would have been entitled to if the husband was alive and he begged us 
not to do that and he said someday you'd break the fund and that's exactly what's 
happened. We've paid this out now for these six years and now the funds depleted 
to the point we have to do something about it. As I understand this bill, first it 
takes the spouse, the beneficiary out of the second injury fund and requires that 
the employer or the insurance company who had the original insurance will have 
to continue to pay those benefits and also the amount she receives from social 
security will be reduced from the payment so that she will get what she's entitled 
to but no more. That's roughly the purpose of this, and if we don't do that there 
isn't going to be any money in the second injury fund to pay anyone so I would 
urge the support of this bill. 
President: Further discussion on senate bill 111 
?????: Call for the question, Mr. President 
President: The question has been called for on the second reading of senate bill 111. The 
questions is shall it be read a third time. Roll call vote. 
CERTIFICATION 
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Ch. 138 LABOR IN GENERAL [776] 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to 
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total dis-
ability shall be required in such instances; in all other cases, however, and 
where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of 
bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in 
sections 35-1-65, 351-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess 
of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week 
for 312 weeks. 
Section 3. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57, 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as 
amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as amended by Chapter 71, 
Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as 
amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65, 
Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as 
amended by Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter 67, 
Laws of Utah 1973, as amended by Chapter 101, Laws of Utah 1975, as 
amended by Chapters 151 and 156, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read: 
35-1-68. Second injury fund created—Purpose—Funding—Injury caus-
ing death—Filing claim within one year—Payment into fund when 
no dependents—Payment to dependents—Presumptions of depen-
dency—Payment to partially dependent persons—Effect of remar-
riage. 
(1) There is created a second injury fund for the purpose of making payj 
ments in accordance with the provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of this title^ 
This fund shall succeed to all monies heretofore held in that fund designated 
as the "special fund" or the "combined injury fund" and whenever reference 
is made elsewhere in this code to the "special fund" or the "combined injury 
fund" that reference shall be deemed to be to the second injury fund. The 
state treasurer shall be the custodian of the second injury fund and the comj 
mission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable administration assistancg 
may be paid from the proceeds of that fund. The attorney general shall 
appoint a member of his staff to represent the second injury fund in all proj 
ceedings brought to enforce claims against it. 
(2) In case injury causes death within the period of six years from the 
date of the accident, the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial 
expenses of the deceased as provided in secTion 35-L81, and further benefits 
in the amounts and to the persons as follows: 
[(1) If thoro arc no dependents, the employer and insurance carrier shall 
pay into the state treasury the sum of $15,600. Any claim for compensation 
must be filed with the commission within one year from the date of dcath-of 
the deceased, and, if at the end of one year from the date of death of the 
[7771 LABOR IN GENERAL Cfa. 138 
&u-ry by the employer or the insin\HHre-^h*p*He3~41khr^ shall be 
reduced by the amount of any weekly CGH-B-pe&Srition payments paid to or due 
Ute-4erease<i-be*-vroen the date of tlv^-^-eielent and his death. Such pay^ m-oftt 
shall be held in a special fu-nd for the purposes provided in this t&ler-fcke 
state treasurer shall bo the custodian of such special fund, and the commis-
sion shall direct the distribution thereof.—If the commission has reasonably 
defcepmifted-that there-are no dopeR-den-t-s--of the deceased, it may order the 
employer or insurance carrier to pay into t-ke-s-tate treasu-py-th-e sum speei-
Med in fekis-sabseetion to be hold in that special fund for a pcrk>d~^4H^e-year-
from the death of the deceased.—Any claim filed within that year fo?-w-h4eh 
an aw-apd is m-ade by the commission shall be paid out of tke-s^am-d^esifced 
by the employer or insurance earner—-before any further claim may be 
fts&ef4e4-rV^a4fi&^4 be^^ioloyer^iMm^^flefeM? a Fr4er-rl 
(a) If the commission has made a determination that there are no depen-
dents of the deceased, it may, prior to a lapse of one year from the date of 
death of a deceased employee, issue a temporary order for the employer or 
insurance carrier to pay into the second injury fund the sum of $18,720. The 
$18,720 shall be reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation pay-
ments paid to or due the deceased between the date of the accident and 
death. Should a dependency claim be filed subsequent to the issuance of 
such an order and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is made by the 
commission, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit 
to the second injury fund by the employer or insurance carrier before any 
further claim may be asserted against the employer or insurance carrier. In 
the event no dependency claim is filed within one year from the date of 
death, the commission's temporary order shall become permanent and final. 
If no temporary order has been issued and no claim for dependency has 
been filed within one year from the date of death, the commission may issue 
a permanent order at any time requiring the carrier or employer to pay 
$18,720 into the second injury fund. Any claim for compensation by a 
dependent must be filed with the commission within one year from the date 
of death of the deceased. 
(b) (j) It there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, 
the payment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 2/3% of the 
decedent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 
for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age 
of eighteen years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children 
not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder of 
the period between the date of the death and not to exceed six years or 312 
weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during depen-
dency following the expiration of the first six-year period described in sub-
section (2)(b)(i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those 
wholly dependent persons during that initial six-year period, reduced by 
50% of any weekly federal social security death benefits paid to those 
wholly dependent persons. 
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(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commis-
sion at the end of the initial six-year period and annually thereafter. If in 
any such review it is determined that, under the facts and circumstances 
existing at that time, the applicant is no longer a wholly dependent person, 
the applicant may be considered a partly dependent or non-dependent 
person and shall be paid such benefits as the commission may determine 
pursuant to subsection (2)(c)(ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse 
of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly depen-
dent for a six-year period from the date of death of the employee. This pre-
sumption shall not apply after the initial six-year period and, in determining 
the then existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the commission 
shall exclude 50% of any federal social security death benefits received by 
that surviving spouse. 
[(&}] {c) ji) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, 
the payment shall be 66 2 /3% of the decedent's average weekly wages at 
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a 
minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder 
of the period between the date of death and not to exceed six years or 312 
weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each case may deter-
mine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of [$15,600] $18,720. 
The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the cir-
cumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury, and 
any amount awarded by the commission under this subsection must be con-
sistent with the general provisions of this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent pursuant to 
subsection (2)(b)(iii) shall be determined by the commission in keeping with 
the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the time of the 
dependency review and may be paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the 
maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person would receive if wholly 
dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during 
their dependency by the employer or insurance carrier. 
[(4)] jd_) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent 
persons at the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as 
it deems just and equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all 
parties concerned shall not exceed the maximum provided for by law. [Fol-
lowing the period during which the employer or its insurance carrier is 
required to pay benefits under this act, there shall be paid to such persons, 
d-uring the period of their dependency, out of the special fund provided for 
in subsection (1), the same benefits as paid by the employer or its insurance 
earner, as provided in subsection (2) and (3). The issue of dependency shall 
be reviewed at the time application is made for additional benefits from the 
special fund.] 
[(&)—The commission shall order that there bo paid to such dependents, 
as provided in subsections (2) and (3), benefits at the rate of 66 2/3% of the 
deceased's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more 
than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
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ih&-+n-jwy^ier—w^4f~^4-4^ minimum of $45 per weekr-*Ht£-oi 
^hrV -^s-peeial fund provided for in subsection (1) and for that period of time 
kegfoning with the time that the payments to be made by the employer or 
to insurance carrier terminate and ending upo-n—t-he termination of said 
dependency.] 
[(4)] (e) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of 
death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its insur-
ance carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination of dependency, 
including any remarriage settlement, does not exceed [$15,6001 $18,720, the 
employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between the 
amount paid and the sum of [$15,600] $18,720 into the [special] second injury 
fund provided for in subsection (1) 
Section 4. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-71, Utah Code Annotated 19o3, as amended by Chapter 151, 
Laws of Utah 1971, is amended to read: 
11!)-J -i 1. Dependents— Pre sumptions— Detemiinatioiiij. 
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly d* \n nduil b»i up 
poi t upon a deceased employee: 
[U-)—A husband or wife u-peft-a-speuso with whom that individual lives at 
£be-t iroe- ef-th-e-deat-hr] 
[(2)] (I) Children under the age of eighteen years or over such age, if 
physically or mentally incapacitated[T] and dependent upon the parent, with 
whom they are living at the time of the death of such parent, or who is 
legally bound for their support. 
(2) For purposes of payments to be made under'S'ubsection (2)(b)(i) of sec-
tion 35-1-68, a surviving husband or wife shall be presumed to be wholly 
dependent upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the time of the 
employee's death. 
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall 
be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing 
at the time of the injury [resulting in the] or death of such employee, except 
for purposes of dependency reviews pursuant to subsection (2)(b)(iii) of sec-
tion 35-1-68. [but no] No person shall be considered as a dependent unless he 
or she is a member of the family of the deceased employee, or bears [to him] 
the relation of husband or wife, lineal descendant, ancestor, or brother or 
sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall include a posthumous 
child, and a child legally adopted prior to the injury. Half brothers and half 
sisters shall be included in the words "brother or sister" as above used. 
Section 5. Section amended. 
Section 35-1-74, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57, 
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959, as 
amended by Chapter 71, Laws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, 
Laws of Utah 1963, as amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as 
amended by Chapters 151 and 156, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read: 
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LEGAL COUNSEL FOR THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION AND EMPLOYERS 
REINSURANCE FUND 
By David S. Ostler 
AN ACT RELATING TO LABOR; AUTHORIZ-
ING THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO 
RETAIN COUNSEL TO REPRESENT THE 
COMMISSION AND THE EMPLOYERS' RE-
INSURANCE FUND; CLARIFYING THE DU-
TIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND 
COUNTY AND CITY ATTORNEYS; AND 
MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
35-1-32, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1971 
35-1-68, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 116, 
LAWS OF UTAH 1988 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Sect ion 1. Sec t ion Amended . 
Section 35-1-32, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1971, is 
amended to read: 
35-1-32. Attorney re ta ined by commiss ion — 
Duties of a t torney general and county and 
city at torneys . 
The commission may [with-the-approval-ofHhe 
govei^m)r-appe4n^a-representative-to-aet-as-speeial 
pros^euter-or-to-defernHn-any-suitr aetionT-proeeed-
ingriftvestigatie^Tl^aFing-e^-trial-relating^to-mat-
tere^thi ivor-^neei^ing-i t^jui4sdktiot t] employ or 
retain counsel to represent the commission in pro-
ceedings to enforce actions of the commission or to 
defend the commission from actions brought 
against it. Upon the request of the commission, the 
attorney general [OF], the county attorney, or city at-
torney of the [eeunty] locality in which any investi-
gation, hearing, or trial [had-under-the provisions of 
this-titlel is pending, in which the employee resides, 
or in which the employer resides or is doing busi-
ness, shall aid [thereinandproseeute,-under-thesu-
per^4sionof^eeommi9siony«ll-neeessary-aetH)n90F 
proeeedmgs-for-the-enforeemenrt-of this-titlel in the 
representation of the commission. 
Sect ion 2. Sect ion Amended . 
Section 35-1-68 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 1988, is 
amended to read: 
35-l~i>3. Employers' Re insurance Fund — 
Injury caus ing death — Burial e x p e n s e s — 
Payments to dependents . 
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund for the purpose of making payments in accor-
dance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. This fund 
shall succeed to all monies previously held in the 
&Special Fund," the ^Combined Injury Fund," or 
the &Second Injury Fund." Whenever this code re-
fers to the &Special Fund," the &Combined Injury 
Fund," or the &Second Injury Fund" that reference 
is considered to be the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. The state t reasurer shall be the custodian of 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the commis-
sion shall direct its distribution. Reasonable admin-
istration assistance may be paid from the proceeds 
of the fund. [The-attorney-general-shall-appoint a 
member of h is^tafTtorepresent-the-Employer^Re-
msuranee-Fund-in-aH- proeeedi ngs-brought-to-en-
foree claims-agfiins^itl The commission may employ 
or retain counsel to represent the Employers' Rein-
surance Fund in proceedings brought to enforce 
claims against or on behalf of the fund. Upon re-
quest of the commission, the attorney general shall 
aid in representation of the fund. 
(2) If injury causes death within a period of six 
years from the date of the accident, the employer or 
insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of 
the deceased as provided in Section 35-1 -81 , and 
further benefits in the amounts and to the persons 
as follows: 
(a) (i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the 
time of the death, the payment by the employer or 
its insurance carrier shall be 66-2/3% of the dece-
dent's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state av-
erage weekly wage at the time of the injury per week 
and not less than a minimum of $45 per week, plus 
$5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each depen-
dent minor child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, 
but not exceeding the average weekly wage of the 
employee at the time of the injury, and not exceeding 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week. Compensation shall continue 
during dependency for the remainder of the period 
between the date of the death and the expiration of 
six years or 312 weeks after the date of the injury. 
(ii) The [weeklyl payment to wholly dependent 
persons during dependency following the expiration 
of the first six-year period described in Subsection 
(2) (a) (i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly 
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons 
during that initial six-year period, reduced by 50% 
of any weekly federal Social Security death benefits 
paid to those wholly dependent persons. 
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to re-
view by the commission a t the end of the initial s ix-
year period and annually thereafter. If in any such 
review it is determined that , under the facts and cir-
cumstances existing at tha t time, the applicant is no 
longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant 
may be considered a partly dependent or nonde-
pendent person and shall be paid such benefits as 
the rv • nission may determine under Subsection 
(2)(b)(ii). 
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determina-
tion, a surviving spouse of a deceased employee 
shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly depen-
dent for a six-year period from the date of death of 
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the employee. This presumption shall not apply af-
ter the initial six-year period and, in determining 
the then existing annual income of the surviving 
spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any 
federal Social Security death benefits received by 
that surviving spouse. 
(b) (i) If there are partly dependent persons at the 
time of the death, the payment shall be 66-2/3% of 
the decedent's average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the in-
jury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 
per week. Compensation shall continue during de-
pendency for the remainder of the period between 
the date of death and the expiration of six years or 
312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission 
in each case may determine. Compensation may not 
amount to more than a maximum of $30,000. The 
benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in 
keeping with the circumstances and conditions of 
dependency existing at the date of injury, and any 
amount awarded by the commission under this sub-
section shall be consistent with the general provi-
sions of this title. 
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly de-
pendent under Subsection (2) (a) (iii) shall be deter-
mined by the commission in keeping with the cir-
cumstances and conditions of dependency existing 
at the time of the dependency review and may be 
paid in [a weekly] an amount not exceeding the max-
imum weekly rate that partly dependent [person] 
persons would receive if wholly dependent. 
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to 
such persons during their dependency by the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier. 
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also 
partly dependent persons at the time of death, the 
commission may apportion the benefits as it consid-
ers just and equitable; provided, that the total bene-
fits awarded to all parties concerned do not exceed 
the maximum provided for by law. 
ttriti. LilU IAJICII cl.IilUU.iit/ U l t l l C 
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HALES v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF UTAH 
f Cite as 854 P ^ d 537 m ^ A . U T A H 
W181B (Utah 1982); Clark v. American "' *3> 
Iridard, Inc., 583 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 
jjf8)/-A third party who benefits only 
dentally from the performance of a con-
* has no right to recover under that 
gtr^ct. Mel Trimble Real Estate v Fitz 
^,626 R2d 453, 454 (Utah 1981)- Rio 
om Corp., 618 P.2d at 506; Tracy Col-
>§52 P.2d at 1315; Schwinghammer 
|tah 2d at 420, 446 P.2d at 415 
Utah 537 
fothing in the bond indicates that 
fter or Northwestern intended to con-
k in plaintiff the right to enforce pay-
& ; T i ? . b 0 n d 0 n I y l i s t s A t I a * and Check 
^obligees. Plaintiff argues that be-
te the purpose of the bond is to safe-
>d against the presentation of the lost 
iicate she is an intended beneficiary 
ffi h ° W e v e r ' overlooks the fact that 
Wild is intended to safeguard and in-
bify Atlas and Check Rite against a 
gre claim on the lost certificate It is 
^intended to protect plaintiff from pur-
ging a stock certificate that has been 
)rted lost or stolen. Performance on 
%bond only incidentally benefits plaintiff 
i-providmg a fund from which her dam-
es,may ultimately be paid. 
Marilyn R. HALES, Widow; Delbert R. 
Hales, Monica M. Hales, and Cristal E. 
Hales, Minor Dependent Children; and 
Robyn L. Chambers, Former Wife of 
David K. Hales, deceased, Petitioners, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH; Emery Mining Corporation, 
aka Utah Power & Light Company; 
and Energy Mutual Insurance Co., Re-
spondents. 
No. 920319-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 23, 1993. 
U Since plaintiff is not a third-party benefi-
!V%n the bond, we affirm the trial 
L,s dismissal of Count IV. 
Petitioners sought review of Industrial 
Commission's order denying their motion 
for review of administrative law judge's 
denial of dependent death benefits. The 
Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held that work-
ers' compensation statute of repose which 
provided death benefits to dependents only 
when work-related injury caused death 
within six years of accident was unconstitu-
tional under open courts provision. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Kr e n ^^? V ° r °f Plaintiff ^ d 
tost Atlas and Check Rite for conver-
g e d wrongful refusal to transfer stock 
ftfrmei The trial court's denial of 
K a n d ^ m ^ of plaintiffs third 
SS^ ft daimS is al- firmed 
P2 r d° f att0rney *» to Pontiff is 
tftu 
Law and Procedure 
g ^ L , C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
$HAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
C° | KmiUMBER SYSTEM^ 
1. Administrative 
<3=*663 
Workers' Compensation <£=>1828 
Administrative law judge's decision 
that workers' compensation claims were 
barred, and Industrial Commission's review 
thereof, constituted formal adjudicative 
proceedings which were properly reviewed 
by Court of Appeals. U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-
4, 63-46b-16. 
2. Appeal and Error <s>893(l) 
Whether statute is constitutional pres-
ents question of law which Court of Ap-
peals considers de novo. 
3... Workers' Compensation <s=*39 
Workers' compensation statute of re-
pose which provided death benefits for de-
pendents of injured employee only when 
work-related injury caused death within six 
years of accident was unconstitutional un-
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der open courts provision, as there was no 
effective and reasonable alternative reme-
dy for dependents; provision allowing dis-
cretionary recovery against special fund 
applied only to dependents who had been 
receiving benefits in their own right and 
discretionary extension of benefits was not 
remedy constitutionally equivalent to right 
to receive benefits. Const. Art. 1, § 11; 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-68(2), 35-1-70. 
Virginius Dabney (argued), Salt Lake 
City, Dabney & Dabney, P.C., for petition-
er. 
Rinehart L. Peshell (argued), Fairbourn 
& Peshell, Midvale, for respondents, Emery 
Min. & Energy Mut. 
Benjamin A. Sims, General Counsel, In-
dustrial Commission of Utah, Salt Lake 
City, for Industrial Com'n of Utah. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Petitioners appeal the Industrial Commis-
sion's order denying their motion for re-
view of an administrative law judge's deci-
sion holding they were not entitled to de-
pendent death benefits. The basis of peti-
tioners' appeal is that the statute under 
which their claims were denied, Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1979), is an unconstitu-
tional statute of repose. We agree and 
accordingly reverse the Commission's or-
der.1 
FACTS 
David K. Hales sustained a compensable 
injury on May 24, 1982, while employed by 
Emery Mining Corporation. He was initial-
ly paid temporary, total disability compen-
sation and was awarded 32% permanent, 
partial disability compensation for orthope-
dic and internal medical problems, anxiety, 
1. Because we find the section an unconstitution-
al statute of repose, we need not address peti-
tioners' second argument that the provision vio-
lates their equal protection rights under the 
Utah Constitution. See Velarde v. Industrial 
m 
depression, and intractable pain. Eventual*? 
ly, he was awarded permanent, total disi j j 
ability compensation. Mr. Hales died orrS 
November 25, 1988, more than six years 
after the accident.
 f ^ 
Petitioners allege that the cause of Mr?i 
Hales's death was his industrial accideri' 
and, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 35&J 
l-68(2)(a) (1979), they filed dependents* 
death claims within one year of the date o$J 
his death. Emery Mining Corporation, Mr.! 
Hales's employer, and its workers' compendia 
sation insurance carrier, Energy Mutual lihM 
surance Company, denied responsibility fori 
death benefits based on the time limitation 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 35^1-68(|j 
(1979), which provides, in part: ", i 
In case injury causes death within th$M 
period of six years from the date of thej 
accident, the employer or insurance carri-^ij 
er shall pay the burial expenses of, theyi 
deceased as provided in section 35-l-8i,^ 
and further benefits [provided in subse^ 
quent subsections of section 68, including) 
payments to the deceased's dependents]^ 
[1] On April 3, 1992, the administrative \ 
law judge held that petitioners' claims were' I 
indeed barred by this statute because Mr.^S 
Hales died more than six years after the J 
accident that allegedly caused his death. 1 
On April 17, 1992, petitioners filed a motion « 
for review with the Commission alleging M 
that the statutory provision in section 35- 9 
1-68(2) violated the Utah Constitutional 
open courts provision by extinguishing^;! 
their constitutional right to litigate a validlS 
claim before their right to file that claiflfejj 
arose. See Utah Const, art. I, § 11. Orijf 
May 6, 1992, the Commission affirmed thel| 
administrative law judge's decision. In s$*< 
doing, the Commission noted the likelihoo&J 
that it would be reversed by this court on 
the authority of Wrolstad v. Industrial^ 
Commission, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App-k 
cert denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990),' 
and Velarde v. Industrial Commission, 
831 P.2d 123 (Utah App.1992), but ex-
Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 130 (Utah App.1992); 
Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 P.2d 243,3 
244 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d H38j 
(Utah 1990). 
HALES v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF UTAH 
Cite as 854 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1993) 
ANALYSIS 
the statute's constitutionality.2 
Utah 539 
pressed the view it had no power to rule on 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[2] The Utah Administrative Proce-
dures Act permits us to grant relief if the 
.'petitioners have been' substantially preju-
diced because "the agency action, or the 
'statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or 
lis applied." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-
!-i"6(4)(a) (1989). Whether the statute is con-
stitutional presents a question of law which 
,we consider de novo. See Velarde, 831 
J>.2d at 125. 
2 * ISSUE ON APPEAL 
{t
 [3] Petitioners assert that Utah Code 
*Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1979), and the various 
^versions thereof subsequently enacted in 
Fthe course of amendment and recodifica-
tion, is an unconstitutional statute of re-
*pose in violation of Article I, Section 11, of 
tyhe Utah Constitution. Section 35-1-68(2) 
^provides that employers or their insurance 
<;carriers shall pay death benefits to depen-
dents only when the work-related injury 
'''causes death within the period of six 
•years from the date of accident." Petition-
ers claim this statute leaves dependents 
'without a remedy if an injured worker sur-
vives more than six years from the date of 
hts^  industrial injury and then dies. Be-
cause the statute terminated the depen-
dents' cause of action before it arose, peti-
•faoners argue, the statute acts as one of 
jtepose. Furthermore, petitioners argue 
ftgat no adequate, alternative remedy exists 
a^nd thus the statute of repose is unconsti-
tutional. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
| | jrp., 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985). 
|§i$^Fhe Industrial Commission also expressed 
||jgo.nfusion as to whether judicial review of its 
Indecision would be initially in this court or by 
l&trial de novo in the district court. The adminis-
gHrative law judge's decision and the Industrial 
g'Commission's review constitute formal adjudi-
c a t i v e proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
p™>-4 (1989). Review is properly in this court. 
SftJtah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 0989). See, e.%., 
m™iarde v. Industrial Commn, 831 P.2d U3 
IWJtah App. 1992); Wrolstad v. Industrial 
giCommH 786 P.2d 243 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
Mr95 p-2d H38 (Utah 1990). No purpose would 
A. Introduction 
The difference between a statute of limi-
tations and a statute of repose is that 
[a] statute of limitations requires a law-
suit to be filed within a specified period 
of time after a legal right has been vio-
lated or the remedy for the wrong com-
mitted is deemed waived. A statute of 
repose bars all actions after a specified 
period of time has run from the occur-
rence of some event other than the occur-
rence of an injury that gives rise to a 
cause of action. 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 
670, 672 (Utah 1985). "A statute of repose 
. . . prevents suit a statutorily specified 
number of years after a particular event 
occurs, without regard to when the cause 
of action accrues." Velarde v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 
1992). An action accrues, generally, "upon 
the happening of th% last event necessary 
to complete the cause of action." Becton 
Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 
1257 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case, petitioners' cause of 
action accrued upon the death of Mr.. Ha-
les, yet the six-year period of section. 35-1-
68(2) had already run so as to bar the 
assertion of their claim. Consequently, 
section 35-1-68(2) acts as a statute of re-
pose. See Velarde, 831 P.2d at 126-27. 
(statute denying silicosis death benefits un-
less death results within three years from 
last day employee worked held to be uncon-
stitutional- statute of repose). Unless the 
law provides an "effective and reasonable" 
alternative remedy, the statute is unconsti-
tutional. Berry, 717 P.2d at 680.3 
be served by a trial de novo in the district court 
where the relevant facts are not in dispute and 
the issue is soJeJy one of law. C). Alumbaugh v. 
White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App.1990) (per cu-
riam) (disputed factual finding, made without 
formal hearing, reviewed by trial de novo in 
district court). 
3. If there is no substitute or alternative remedy 
provided, the statute of repose may be justified 
only if there is a "clear social or economic evil 
to be eliminated" and the means selected to 
remedy the evil are not "arbitrary or unreason-
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Respondents argue that section 35-1-68 
does not violate the open courts provision 
of the Utah Constitution "because Petition-
ers can still pursue their claims against the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund," formerly 
the second injury fund. Respondents claim 
section 35-1-68(2) does not cut off the 
claims of the deceased's dependents, but 
merely limits the liability of the employer 
or insurance carrier for death benefits to 
the period of six years from the date of the 
employee's injury. As to benefits payable 
after the six years, dependents have an 
alternative remedy by pursuing their 
claims against the special fund, provided 
for in section 35-1-68(1), under Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988). 
Section 70 provides, in its entirety, as 
follows: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who 
have been receiving the benefits of this 
title, at the termination of such benefits 
are yet in a dependent condition, and 
under all reasonable circumstances 
should be entitled to additional benefits, 
the industrial commission may, in its dis-
cretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; 
but the liability of the employer or insur-
ance carrier involved shall not be extend-
ed, and the additional benefits allowed 
shall be paid out of the special fund 
provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section 
35-1-68. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988) (emphasis 
added). 
Respondents argue that petitioners were 
receiving benefits under "this title," and 
thus have an alternative remedy pursuant 
to section 35-1-70, because Mr. Hales was 
receiving permanent, total disability bene-
fits under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 
(1988). That section states that an "em-
ployee shall receive" compensation which 
may not be more than 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury . . . [and] may not be less than the 
sum of $45 per week,, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each de-
pendent child under the age of 18 
able." Berry, 111 P.2d at 680. Respondents do 
not argue that there is any social or economic 
evil to be eliminated and, therefore, the issue is 
years, up to a maximum of four such 
dependent minor children 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988) (emphasis 
added). 
Based upon the above quoted statutes, 
respondents argue that although the em-
ployee receives the check under section 67, 
the dependents are included in the calcula-
tions determining benefits and the depen-
dents, therefore, are receiving benefits, al-
beit through the injured employee. Conse-
quently, respondents continue, petitioners 
were receiving benefits pursuant to section 
35-1-70 and may proceed against the spe-
cial fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1). 
Respondents conclude that even if section 
68(2) extinguishes petitioners' death benefit 
claims against the employer before they 
arise, this alternative remedy available to 
them through section 35-1-70 precludes 
section 35-1-68(2) from being unconstitu-
tional. Respondents bolster their argu-
ment by submitting that if section 35-1-70 
did not apply in the instant case, it would 
never apply. 
Petitioners respond by arguing that just 
because the minimum permanent disability 
compensation an employee may receive 
pursuant to section 35-1-67 includes, as 
part of the calculation, $5 for a dependent 
spouse plus $5 for each dependent minor 
child, the dependents here were not neces-
sarily "receiving the benefits" for purposes 
of section 35-1-70. Furthermore, petition-
ers submit, without contravention, that Mr. 
Hales's disability pay did not include the $5 
per dependent allowance referred to in sec-
tion 35-1-67 because he was collecting the 
maximum weekly rate without the addition-
al dependents' allowance being considered. 
By analyzing both the scheme of the 
relevant statutes and their history, we con-
clude that section 35-1-70 does not provide 
the beneficiaries with an "effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy." Berry, 
111 P.2d at 680. 
B. Statutory Scheme 
The statutory scheme specifically distin-
guishes between employee payments and 
confined to whether a reasonable alternative 
remedy is available. 
HALES v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF UTAH 
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payments to dependents. Section 35-1-66 no longer. 1917 Utah 
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sets out the compensation that an "em-
ployee ... may receive" for his or her 
permanent, partial disability. Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-66 (1988) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, section 35-1-67 outlines the dis-
ability payments an "employee shall re-
ceive." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988) 
(emphasis added). Both sections provide 
that the minimum compensation a worker 
shall receive is to be a sum certain plus $5 
if the worker has a dependent spouse, plus 
$5 for dependent children under 18, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent children. 
The maximum compensation allowed by 
these sections, which is what Mr. Hales 
apparently received, makes no reference to 
dependents and is based on an entirely 
different formula. Just because the exis-
tence of a dependent spouse or dependent 
children increases the minimum compen-
sation a partially or totally disabled em-
ployee receives, it does not follow that 
those dependents are receiving benefits for 
purposes of section 35-1-70. There is no 
requirement that the additional $5 be paid 
over to or used for the benefit of the de-
pendents. By contrast, section 35-1-68 
specifically provides for benefits that are 
paid to dependents. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-68(2) (1988). Thus, section 35-1-70 
applies only to dependents who have been 
receiving benefits in their own right. 
A historical review of sections 35-1-70 
and 35-1-68 confirms our conclusion that 
receipt of disability payments by an injured 
employee with dependents does not consti-
tute receipt of benefits by dependents for 
purposes of section 35-1-70. 
C. Statutory History 
The predecessor of the present depen-
dent death benefits statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-68 (1988), was first enacted by 
the Utah Legislature in 1917. 1917 Utah 
Laws ch. 100, § 79. That original statute 
provided death benefits to dependents, paid 
by the employer or its insurer, for the 
period "between the date of the death, and 
six years after the date of the injury," but 
4. The failings of such a system are highlighted 
in the scenario where a dependent child was 
one year old at the time of the employee's injury 
Laws ch. 100, 
§ 79(2). As originally adopted, the death 
benefits ended six years after the injury 
regardless of whether the spouse or child 
might still be dependent and in need.4 Ob-
viously in an attempt to remedy this harsh 
scheme, the 1917 death benefits statute 
was amended four years later to include 
the following language, which language is 
the statutory ancestor of the current sec-
tion 35-1-70: 
If any wholly dependent persons, who 
have been receiving the benefits of this 
Act, and who, at the termination of such 
benefits are yet in a dependent condition, 
and under all reasonable circumstances, 
should be entitled to additional benefits, 
the industrial commission may, at its dis-
cretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; 
but the liability of the employer or insur-
ance carrier involved shall not be extend-
ed, but the additional benefits allowed 
shall be paid out of the special fund 
provided for in subdivision 1 of this sec-
tion. 
1921 Utah Laws ch. 67, § 3140(7) (emphasis 
added). 
The initial placement of the language of 
section 35-1-70 within the death benefits 
statute demonstrates that the phrase "re-
ceiving the benefits" referred to depen-
dents receiving benefits—death benefits— 
in their own right; the provision has no 
relevance to dependents of employees who 
have been receiving disability benefits, but 
who have not themselves been receiving 
benefits. And this holds true even if the 
dependents have been taken into account in 
calculating the amount of disability bene-
fits received by the employee. 
In over seventy years since the words 
now found in section 35-1-70 were original-
ly adopted, they have remained essentially 
unchanged. The only significant change 
has been that the provision was taken out 
of the predecessor of the death benefits 
section—section 68—and made its own self-
standing section in 1933. Utah Rev.Stat. 
§ 42-1-66 (1933). Although this provision 
and the benefits ended automatically, with no 
chance of extension, when the child was only 
seven years old. 
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for continuing death benefits in special 
cases has remained a self-contained provi-
sion up to the present day codification in 
section 35-1-70, its origin as a part of the 
death benefits section is significant. 
Again, the 1921 amendment of the death 
benefits statute remedied the situation in 
which the six-year limitation had run, but 
an employee's survivors were still depen-
dent and in need. This amendment allowed 
the Industrial Commission to extend bene-
fits, at its discretion, for those dependent 
individuals. So long as death benefits as 
of right automatically ceased after the six 
year limitation, the escape valve provided 
in what is now section 35-1-70 was neces-
sary to remedy injustices. However, in 
1973 the death benefits statute was amend-
ed to automatically provide benefits "KM" 
lowing the period during which the employ-
er or its insurance carrier is required to 
pay benefits under this act . . . during the 
period of their dependency." 1973 Utah 
Laws ch. 67, § 5 (codified as Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-68(4) (1973)). Under this 1973 
amendment, death benefits were to be paid, 
after six years from the date of injury, 
from the special fund provided for in sec-
tion 35-1-68(1) until the termination of de-
pendency.5 This amendment obviated the 
need for dependents to seek the discretion-
ary extension of death benefits under sec-
tion 35-1-70 because the benefits were now 
extended as of right, assuming only that 
the individual remained in a dependent con-
dition. The 1973 amendment, automatical-
ly extending benefits, was recodified in 
5. We express no definitive opinion on an issue 
likely to surface on remand, namely, whether 
petitioners' claim should have been asserted 
against the fund rather than respondents and, if 
so, whether their petition may now be amended 
to join the fund. We note, however, that section 
35-l-68(2)(b)(ii) appears only to contemplate a 
continuation of death benefits by the fund in 
situations where the employer's responsibility 
has first been determined within the six-year 
period and does not appear to hold open the 
avenue of proceeding directly against the fund 
in situations, like this one, where death occurs 
outside the six-year period. 
6. The former Utah Code Ann. § 35—1— 
68(2)(b)(ii) (1979) is now codified as § 35-1-
68(2)(a)(ii) (Supp.1992). We note that none of 
the several amendments to this section have any 
1979 as Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(b)(ii) 
(1979), pursuant to legislation that further 
refined the calculation of benefits to be 
paid "following the expiration of the first 
six-year period." 1979 Utah Laws ch. 138, 
§ 3.6 
This legislative history reveals that the 
phrase "receiving the benefits" under sec-
tion 35-1-70 was intended to refer to the 
beneficiary receiving benefits in his or her 
own right—i.e., death benefits payable to 
the dependent—not to the employee receiv-
ing other kinds of benefits calculated in 
part, and only where the maximum was not 
reached, with reference to dependents. 
Thus, section 35-1-70 simply does not ap-
ply to the instant case.7 
D. Inadequate Alternative 
Finally, even if we were to assume that 
section 35-1-70 somehow applies in this 
case, it does not save the statute of repose 
because it does not provide an effective and 
reasonable alternative remedy. The exten-
sion of benefits permitted under section 
35-1-70 is wholly discretionary. This dis-
cretionary extension of benefits is not a 
remedy that is constitutionally equivalent 
to the right to receive death benefits that 
the statute of repose terminates before it 
has accrued. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Commis-
sion's decision is reversed, as it predicted, 
bearing on our analysis. Our analysis and con-
clusion apply to all of the permutations of sec-
tion 35-1-68. 
7. Admittedly, under the present statutory 
scheme in which the extension of benefits be-
yond the six-year period is no longer discretion-
ary with the Commission so long as death bene-
fit recipients remain dependent, section 35-1-70 
would rarely, if ever, be applied. It appears the 
section escaped repeal, as no longer necessary, 
by virtue of its separate section status. As a 
glance at the annotation notes will show, the 
Legislature has repeatedly tinkered with section 
35-1-68, unmindful that, from 1973 on, those 
changes rendered section 35-1-70, to which no 
particular legislative attention seems to have 
been paid for over seven decades, quite unneces-
sary. 
